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Why do men find young women more attractive than older
women? Why do women find high status men more
attractive? The answer from recent evolutionary psycholo-
gists is that younger women are more likely to be fertile and
healthy, and their progeny are more likely to survive. Thus,
natural selection, acting primarily on our Pleistocene hunter-
gatherer forebears, has led men’s preferences to be driven by
genetic makeup to optimize the chances of their genes being
preserved. Women’s preferences, by contrast, have been
selected by the need to insure long-term care for offspring.
The book at hand is a critique of such explanations, written
by a philosopher of science, and directed at the weakness of
evidence that such arguments display. The arguments, says
Richardson, are “just so” stories, perhaps plausible but lacking
in the kind of evidence required by biological accounts of
evolution by natural selection. Evolutionary psychology is
poor science, by the standards of evolutionary biology.
Richardson is not the first philosopher of science to
undertake a critique of evolutionary psychology. Starting
with Phillip Kitcher’s (1985) attack on sociobiology
through David Buller’s (2005) attack from the standpoint
of psychology, philosophers of science have been withering
in their criticism of evolutionary psychology. Richardson
joins this literature using the standards of biological
explanation as the ground for his attack. He brings to the
task a wide knowledge of biology and a critical eye for the
kinds of accounts that can count as explanation supported
by empirical evidence.
What’s wrong with evolutionary psychology’s explana-
tion of men’s and women’s preferences? The short answer,
according to Richardson, is that the kinds of evidence
needed to test the claim are absent and that alternative
explanations are not given sufficient weight. Thus, “if men
preferred older women, that could be ‘explained’ by
pointing out that older women are ‘proven’ as mothers”
(p. 143). Further, evolutionary psychology is criticized for
being excessively adaptationist, ignoring “spandrels,” de-
velopmental alternatives, and other, non-selectionist, mech-
anisms. Instead, the presence of complexity in human
behavior, cognition, and language is assumed to be the
result of evolution by natural selection, usually with
reference to selection factors that operated in the Pleisto-
cene. Richardson does not deny that natural selection is
important (as he makes clear in the Introduction and
throughout the book), nor that all human characteristics
are ultimately the product of evolution. Still, he claims that
an adaptationism results from the exclusive focus on just
one mechanism of evolution (see especially pp. 53–59).
Adaptationism is a bias because it rules out explanations
based upon, for example, the emergence of complexity
from the dynamics of simpler processes played out in
developmental time. For example, rules of inference could
be based on natural selection of “cheater detection”
modules, as Cosmides and Tooby claim, but they could
also arise as a byproduct of early learning, which could
establish social rules for reasoning about social contracts.
Cosmides and Tooby have not ruled out the alternative
explanation, according to Richardson.
The adaptationist bias is, in turn, accompanied by
characteristically weak evidence provided in support of a
natural selection account. For example, differential mate
preferences among men and women are assumed to have
resulted from selection as the only available explanation.
But, says Richardson, there has been a failure to specify
what the presumed adaptations are adaptations for, nor are
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they based upon relevant evidence about the historical
course of evolution of the to-be-explained preferences.
To illustrate Richardson’s approach, consider his account
in Chapter 2 of reverse engineering, which uses the design
features of an organism to extrapolate backwards to the
presumed function of the features and to provide evidence for
their origin in some functional achievement. Thus, fossils of
Archaeopteryx, long thought to be the “first bird,” possess
feathered wings, but it is now known that the species could
not really fly. Feathers certainly aid flight, but they were not
originally selected because they were adapted to flight.
Rather, the details of the evolution of flight are not simple.
Only a detailed reconstruction of the evolutionary history of
Archaeopteryx, and of its ancestors and successors, allows
one to see that it is a transitional species between earlier
theropods and later birds. Richardson’s point is that simply
reasoning backward from the design to the function is
insufficient—you must also have the relevant historical data
to make the reverse engineering argument work.
Within evolutionary psychology, David Buss’s work on the
evolution of jealousy is used as one example of the reverse
engineering approach (see pp. 59–64). Jealousy in men is
primarily triggered by sexual infidelity, whereas emotional
infidelity is a more powerful trigger for women. Buss
attributes the difference to the natural selection of an adapted
response; for men, paternity is unsure, so it makes sense that
jealousy would operate to prevent sexual infidelity, whereas
for women, there is no doubt about maternity, but there is
doubt about long-term commitment. Jealousy is thus a reaction
to the differing evolutionary problems of men and women.
Richardson describes the evidence offered by Buss as “social
psychological” in character: surveys of men’s and women’s
preferences, differing responses to jealousy “scenarios,” cross-
cultural studies, and the like.
Still, the critique is not centered on the adequacy or
inadequacy of the psychological evidence offered by Buss
(ground that has been more extensively covered by Buller
2005), but rather on the failure to demonstrate that natural
selection is the explanation. Thus, Buss has shown
consistency between the evolutionary model and the
psychological data, but he has not shown that the data
follow from the constraints provided by the environment in
ancestral times. According to Richardson, Buss, and other
evolutionary psychologists, “Having assumed the ‘fact’ of
design, they ‘explain’ the complex structures and behaviors
we see as the consequence of natural selection, often
without independent evidence. They do not argue for
design but from form to function and then again from
function to form” (p. 86, emphasis in original).
Richardson describes in detail two other approaches to
the evidence needed for evolutionary psychology’s explan-
ations. In addition to arguments from “reverse engineer-
ing,” in Chapter 3, he considers arguments based on
inferences to effects from relevant causes (as is done in
population biology) and in Chapter 4, arguments designed
to disentangle historical ancestry from existing structure (as
is done by cladistics). While all three kinds of analyses are
important in biology (and many examples are given),
Richardson argues that they are misused or not used at all
in evolutionary psychology.
In the end, Richardson does not argue that evolution by
natural selection is unimportant for understanding psycho-
logical aspects of human functioning. Instead, he argues
that the specific cases are under-supported and that the
evidence given does not justify them as explanations;
they must therefore be regarded as speculations. Specu-
lation is important in science, but it is just as important
to know when to confess that something is not tested
and hence must be regarded as mere speculation. For
Richardson, most of evolutionary psychology falls in that
category.
Because of the subtlety of the arguments and the depth
of biological argument given, the book is most suitable for
those with some prior familiarity with evolutionary
biology and evolutionary psychology. The writing style
is sometimes dense and the arguments can be hard to
follow. Occasional text “boxes” are used to develop some
technical points, but these seem hastily constructed and
even include some errors. For example, Galton’s “regres-
sion to the mean” is defined as a decline in variance over
generations (p. 102), which is misleading for modern
readers. Instead, it is the tendency (for example) for taller
than average parents to have shorter children and for
shorter than average parents to have taller children. Such
“regression” is an inherent statistical property of correlated
distributions and occurs whether or not overall variance
stays the same.
In spite of such minor flaws, the book is an important
addition to the literature on evolutionary psychology. It will
not answer the question about sexual preferences posed at the
beginning of this review, and it suggests that the question may
never be answered. But the book does pose a serious challenge
to evolutionary psychologists who must address the short-
comings, real or perceived, in their arguments.
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